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Ask any investor what corporate 
governance is about, and it is very likely 
that they will say that it is about the 
question of how shareholders of publicly 
traded firms can make sure that they 
get a return on their investment. That 
this will happen is not always obvious, 
given that professional managers, who 
may seek to serve themselves rather 
than the shareholders, call the shots 
in the firms they own. 
 In practice, however, this dominant 
way of thinking about corporate 
governance only applies to the US 
and the UK, where publicly traded 
firms are owned by highly dispersed 
and individually relatively powerless 
shareholders, and where managers 
therefore have ample opportunity 
to serve themselves rather than 
the shareholders. 
 Things are quite different in 
continental Europe, however, where 
the ownership of public firms is typically 
in the hands of a few large and hence 
powerful ‘blockholders’, and where, 
next to shareholders, employees are 
also powerful and well protected by 
labour institutions. Does this mean 
that continental European corporate 
governance does not fit the currently 
dominant Anglo-Saxon way of thinking 
about corporate governance? 
 A recent meta study that we’ve 
published – Competition and 
Cooperation in Corporate Governance: 
The Effects of Labour Institutions 
on Blockholder Effectiveness in 23 
European Countries – confirms that 
corporate governance in continental 
European countries differs from the 
currently dominant Anglo Saxon model 
in a number of critically important ways.
Hands-on approach
As explained above, first, continental 
European firms are often owned by a 
few large ‘blockholders’, some of whom 
are actively and durably involved in the 
firms they own. Combining all research 
findings on European corporate 
governance to date, the study presents 
evidence that such ‘relational investors’ 
typically add more value to firms than 
institutional investors. The latter often 
take a hands-off approach towards the 
firm’s managers. 
 With so many firms to pay attention 
to, institutional investors simply cannot 
afford to be actively involved with any 
particular firm they own. If institutional 
investors are unhappy with how a given 
firm performs, they prefer to sell their 
shares in the firm rather than become 
actively involved in its management, 
which in the short run will depress 
rather than boost firm value. 
 In contrast, relational investors 
are both able and motivated to get 
involved in the firms they own, and on 
the balance of the available empirical 
evidence to date, it turns out that their 
involvement matters positively for 
firm value. 
 A second important difference 
between Anglo-Saxon and continental 
European corporate governance 
involves the role of employees. In 
most continental European countries, 
employees are organised in strong 
labour unions and are well protected 
by labour laws protecting them against 
dismissal and giving them voice in the 
companies they work for. 
 Whereas mandatory works councils 
are found in many jurisdiction, in 
places like Finland or Germany 
employee representation also involves 
seats on the corporate board. This 
means that collective employee 
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interests are a force to be reckoned 
with in continental Europe. European 
corporate governance should therefore 
perhaps be more concerned with 
powerful employees than with powerful 
managers. Although protagonists of the 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
model have acknowledged the power 
of employees in continental European 
firms, they tend to conceive of the 
relationship between shareholders 
and employees as an adversarial one 
in which the two parties compete for 
the largest slice of a given corporate 
pie. This is different in many continental 
European countries, which brings 
us to the third difference with the 
dominant Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance model.
 In contrast to so-called ‘liberal 
market economies’ such as the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, in which capital 
and labour compete with each other 
through competitive factor markets, 
so-called ‘co-ordinated market 
economies’ like Denmark, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands have developed 
labour institutions that enable active 
co-operation for mutual benefit 
between blockholding shareholders 
and organised employee interests. 
 Thus labour laws that protect 
employees against dismissals, for 
example, can actively stimulate 
employees’ investments in valuable 
firm-specific skills that they would 
not make without some form of 
employment protection. Also, labour 
institutions that increase employee 
voice in the firm engender the type 
of co-operation between blockholders 
and employee interests that facilitate 
the kind of continuous innovations and 
quality improvements that German 
Mittelstand firms are known for. 
 Better labour protection is not just 
a blunt weapon that workers bring to 
the negotiation table when it is time 
to set new collective agreements or 
develop extensive social plans in 
times of corporate crisis. It is in many 
cases a much gentler instrument that 
gets blockholders and workers alike 
interested in jointly enlarging the 
corporate pie rather than splitting the 
one currently in front of them. 
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